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IN Tllf: SUPRLJlE COURT

or

TIIE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Vs.

Case No.
12785

PAUL JOE MARTINEZ,

Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action charging
the defendant with burglary in the second
degree.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The jury found defendant guilty of
burglary in the second degree.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the jury
(1)

verdict of guilty of burglary in the second
as a matter of law and fact or that
failing, a remand of the case to the District
Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Approximately 11:00 p.m., May 7, 1971,
an individual was observed about a late model
pickup truck and camper located in a parking area near the corner of Willow and
Stephens Streets in Ogden, Utah.

That

individual was further observed proceeding
around the corner onto Willow in a generally
easterly direc_tion.

(TR 4, lines 16 through

20, lines 26 through 27; TR 6, lines 7
through 9.)
Later, an individual appeared to be
crouching in an alley off Willow, paralleling Stephens about one-half block east.
(TR 23, lines 5 through 8.)
Still later, it was discovered that
the aforementioned truck and camper had been
(2)

broken into and a tape deck und two tapes
were missing.

(TR 54, lines 1 through 4 .)

Again later, an individual was noticed
about a truck parked op Willow, across from
the Hitching Post Lounge.

(TR 25, lines 24

through 27.)
Shortly thereafter, Paul Joe Martinez
was apprehended proceeding away from the
truck on Willow and taken to the front of
the Hitching Post Lounge, located on the
corner of Willow and Wall Avenues.

(TR 27,

5 through 12.)
Around midnight, Officer Donald R.
Moore arrived at the Hitching Post Lounge
to conduct an investigation.

Officer Moore

searched Paul Joe Martinez and discovered a
set of Ford ignition keys.
through 16.)

(TR 46, lines 9

Officer Moore then summoned

Officer Grant J. Price to the Hitching Post
Lounge for the purpose of booking Mr.
Martinez.

(TR 68, lines 16 through 27.)
(3)

Oificer Price booked Mr. Martinez in the
Weber Cou11ty Jail and returned to the scene
to aid Officer Moore in conducting the
investigation.

(TR 7 2, iines 8 through 12.)

During the investigation, a stereo
tape deck and two tapes were discovered in
"bootn area of a Ford convertible (TR 49,

'!

lines 8 through 13.) parked on Stephens,
south of the Willow intersection, approxi-

'i

'•

'I

mately one and one-half blocks from the
Hitching Post Lounge, and one block from the
burglarized truck.

No search warrant was

obtained (TR 63, lines 4 through 7), and the
convertible could not be seen from the
Hitching Post Lounge.
4.)

(TR SO, lines 2 through

The deck and tapes were discovered 30

to 60 minutes following defendant's arrest:
(TR 63

lines 12 through 17), and the p lexi-

glass rear window of the convertible was
zipped out (TR 63, lines 18 through 22), but
the testimony of the investigating officers
is in conflict with regard to other events
(4)

surrounding the cJ iscovl!ry of the cJC!ck and
tapes.
Officer Price testified twice that he
and Officer Moore were looking for a Ford
convertible (TR 217, line 6; TR 7 2, lines 3
and 4.)

This information was supplied Officer

Moore by his investigation and interrogation of Mr. Martinez at the Hitching Post
Lounge (TR 46, lines 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20.)
When Officer Price and Officer Moore found
the vehicle, Officer Price, while checking
the vehicle, picked up the plexiglass flap
(TR 69, lines 26 and 27), discovered the
deck and tapes and informed Officer Moore
(TR 69, lines 21 and 22).

Officer Price

further testified that he didn't see the
deck and tapes until he lifted the flap
(TR 20, lines 20 and 21).
- Officer Moore, on the other hand,
testified that upon learning Paul Joe Martinez
had driven to the area in a Ford automobile
began to search for Paul Joe Martinez's car
(5)

(TR 116, lines 2G and 27).

Upon discovering

Paul Joe l'lLirtincz 's car, Officer Moore
testified he discovered the deck and tapes
under the p lex iglass wind ow (TR 48, lines 4
through 7) .

Officer Moore further testified

that the deck and tapes

visible through

the plexiglass (TR 49, lines 14 through 16).
Over defendant's objection, the deck
and the tapes were

on the ground

that the actions of Officer Moore and Officer
Price constituted a seizure without search
as the items were in plain sight (TR 64,
lines 4 through 10; TR 74, lines 1 through
6) .

POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF
GUILTY RENDERED BY THE JURY AGAINST
DEFENDANT.
There is nothing contained in the
transcript of proceedings which positively
identifies Paul Joe Martinez as the individual seen near the burglarized truck (TR 17,
( 6)

lines 9 through 12) .

None of the witnesses

were able to identify Paul Joe Martinez
until he was apprehended.

The witnesses

were able to identify only the man who was
apprehended, Paul Joe Martinez.
Further, there is no testimony of any
sort connecting the figure near the burglarized truck with the automobile belonging to
Paul Joe Martinez.

Nor is there a shred of

evidence placing Paul Joe Martinez anywhere
near the automobile from the time the truck
was burglarized until Paul Joe Martinez was
apprehended.
Yet, the jury must have chosen to
believe that, somehow, Paul Joe Martinez,
removed the deck and tapes from the truck
and secreted them in his car.

Yet the State,

in an effort to somehow connect Paul Joe
Martinez with the truck, attempted to raise
an inference that Paul Joe Martinez was the
man near the truck and was periodically
observed until apprehended.
(7)

The evidence

at no time pL:ices Pu.ul Joe Martinez or anyone
ec·lse anywhere neu.r Paul Joe Mu rt inez' s
automobile; but, on the contru.ry, would
suggest Paul Joe Mu.rtinez was never anywhere near the automobile.
The jury should not have found PalJ.l
Joe Martinez was the man who burglarized
the truck for failure of identification.
Further, the inconsistency in the states
evidence in attempting to place Paul Joe
Martinez in several places almost simultaneously should have been resolved in favor
of Paul Joe Mu.rtinez.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY A \VARRANTLESS
SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court held the deck and
tapes discovered in Paul Joe Martinez's
car were in plain sight; and, as such, were
not discovered pursuant to a search subject
to constitutional protection.
The evidence, however, does not support
(8)

tl1is view.

First, the Officers cJ icJ not have

any inl01'n1ation with regard to the location
of the defendant's automobile.

A search

was, in fact, conducted to locate the automobile.

Secondly, the greatest weight of

the evidence supports the proposition that
a search of the automobile was conducted
when the automobile was discovered.

It

should be remembered in this regard, that
the search for and of the automobile took
place in the middle of the night with the
aid of flashlights in an area of little or
no street lighting.

Further, Officer Price

testified that the plexiglass covering the
evidence was opaque to a degree that it was
necessary to lift it to observe the deck
and tapes.

State's exhibit

11

J", a photo-

graph of the plexiglass in question is
further evidence of the difficulty one
would experience in discerning items thereunder in the light of day, let alone the
(9)

black of njght.
While the "plain sight" "exception" to
the seizure of evidence without a warrant
is recognized in Utah; it is important to
note that, in order for evidence to be
admitted thereunder, the evidence must not
be the objective of an ongoing search and
must, indeed, be in plain sight.

State vs.

Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 p.2d. 517
(1968); State vs. Richards, No. 12323,
October 5, 1971; Harris vs. United States,
390 u. s. 234 (1968).
In the instant case, a search was
underway before defendant's car was even
discovered; and, while Officer Moore claimed
he could observe the deck and tapes under
opaque plexiglass in the middle of the
night, the greater weight of the evidence
supports the proposition that the search
which was already underway continued with
the discovery of defendant's automobile.
(10)

'Jh1s, the car, cJ eek and t t1pcs

th c

object of an ongoing scurch; and, most
certainJy the deck and tapes were not in
plain sight.
The State argued that the search and
seizure were pursuant to a lawful arrest,
but the search and seizure were contemporaneous neither in time nor place with the
arrest as required by Preston vs. United
States, 376 U. S. 364 (1964).

The State

also argued that the authorities were simply
taking an inventory, but there was no
routine administive search in the instant
case as was the case in State vs. Criscola,

21 Utah 2d 272, 444 p.2d. 517 (1968).
Finally, the State argued that an automobile could be searched on an officer's
probable cause rather than a magistrate 1 s;
but in the instant case, the vehicle was
unoccupied, and authorities had custody of
both Paul Joe Martinez and the ignition
(11)

kl'YS alJl'ogating

the risks inl.erent in cusr_,s

where a vehicle is occupied by alerted,
arined suspects, as was the case in Chambers

vs. Moroney

399 U. S. 42 (1970).

The Trial Court rejected the latter
three theories of admissibility in finding
the evidence was in plain sight.
The primary focus should involve an
application of the standard adopted in State
vs. Criscola, supra, and reaffirmed in
State vs. Richards, supra:
"The guest ion to be answered is
whether under the circumstances the
search or seizure is one which fairmind ed persons, knowing the facts,
and giving due consideration to the
rights and interests of the public,
as well as to those of the suspect,
would judge to be an unreasonable or
oppressive intrusion against the
latterrs rights . . . . n
When the "reasonableness test" is
applied, it should become apparent that it
would have been perfectly reasonable in the
instant case to require investigating
officers to obtain a warrant.

Paul Joe

Mnrtinez was in jail when the search was
( 12)

conclucteu as 111uc11 as one ( J) full hour

after his arrest.

Investigating officers

knew he had driven to the scene and had
possession of his ignition keys.

There was

no evidence he may have 11ad an accomplice.
At no time was there any danger the vehicle
may be removed, especially after officers
discovered the automobile.
CONCLUSION
Paul Joe Martinez was never positively
tied to the burglary, and the State would
place him in more than one place at the
same time.
Under the circumstances, a warrantless
search of Paul Joe Martinez's automobile was
unreasonable and evidence obtained thereby
should have been excluded.
This case should be remanded to the
District Court for dismissal or for a new
trial.

(13)

.

.•

(14)

